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We benchmarked our prompt-injection detector against OWASP's LLM Top

We benchmarked our prompt-injection detector against OWASP's LLM Top

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Adding a ML layer pushes recall to 98.1%, at the cost of ~450ms latency and false positive rates that still need work.We're publishing this first because the deterministic layer is already solid, fast and fully reproducible. The ML false-positive work is in progress — the "Known limitations" section below is part of this post, not a footnote.MethodologyThe corpus contains 106 malicious prompts, 20 ordinary benign prompts, and 12 hard negatives — benign prompts worded to resemble attacks (e.g. Typically requests that talk about security or API keys without exposing any.

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Canonical URLhttps://www.cerbereag.site/blog/detecting-prompt-injection-in-production
Publication timeSat, 26 Sep 2026 16:51:35 +0000
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benchmarkDetecting prompt injection in productionOur first public benchmark for AgentGuard's detection runtime: recall, false positives and latency for each layer, measured against a corpus mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications.September 26, 2026 · benchmark v1.0.0 · reproducible corpus and hashes below91.5%recall — regex only98.1%recall — regex + ML0%false positives — regex onlyShort version: the deterministic regex layer catches 91.5% of the attacks in our corpus with 0% false positives, under a millisecond. Adding a ML layer pushes recall to 98.1%, at the cost of ~450ms latency and false positive rates that still need work.We're publishing this first because the deterministic layer is already solid, fast and fully reproducible.

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