Niri Security Model
The Niri Security Model assumes that programs running unsandboxed on the host are trusted, which can lead to various security vulnerabilities. Unsandboxed clients can access sensitive information and manipulate user input through various means. To mitigate these risks, a proper sandboxing solution, such as Flatpak, is recommended to restrict access to critical system components.
- ▪Programs running unsandboxed on the host can exploit various methods to gain access to sensitive information.
- ▪Unsandboxed clients with access to Niri's Wayland socket can record screens, emulate input, and manipulate user sessions.
- ▪A proper sandboxing solution is necessary to prevent untrusted clients from accessing critical system resources.
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Record
| Original publisher | Github |
| Canonical URL | https://niri-wm.github.io/niri/Security-Model.html |
| Publication time | Wed, 29 Apr 2026 09:32:25 +0000 |
| Retrieval time | 2026-04-29T10:06:15.560Z |
| Last seen | 2026-04-29T10:06:15.560Z |
| Headline source | Publisher (no WeSearch rewrite) |
| Excerpt source | publisher body |
| Excerpt method | First ~120 words (~800 chars) of extracted publisher body, fair-use limited. |
| Summary | WeSearch · cerebras-chat (WeSearch summarizer) |
| Summary source text | contentText |
| Citation coverage | Summary is a WeSearch-generated derivative; primary citation is the original publisher URL. |
| Cluster | Z7Pqzlt7-7AV |
| Cluster logic | Grouped by semantic title/content similarity across sources within a rolling window. Same-publisher template collisions are excluded from coverage comparison. |
| Ranking reason | Story pages are not engagement-ranked. Hub feeds use recency, with optional source-diversified chronological ordering (cap consecutive stories per source). No personalized ranking. |
| Publisher visit | Yes — open original |
| Substitutes article? | No — link-out required for full text |
Rights status (four layers)
WeSearch handling by dimension
| Indexing | May the item be indexed (stored, ranked, made findable)? | Allowed |
| Snippet | May a short excerpt of the publisher's text be shown? | Allowed |
| AI summary | May WeSearch generate its own short summary of the article? | Limited |
| Retrieval / RAG | May the content be exposed for third-party retrieval-augmented generation? | Not asserted |
| Model training | May the content be used to train AI models? | Not asserted |
| Commercial reuse | May the content be reused commercially? | Not permitted |
Basis: Derived from the published RSS/Atom feed. Contact: [email protected]. Reviewed: 2026-07-24.
Opening excerpt (first ~120 words) tap to expand
Security Model Niri assumes that programs running unsandboxed on the host are trusted. This is a reasonable assumption because programs running on the host have a wide variety of ways to get all access they need, even without niri. For instance: They can set $LD_PRELOAD in .bashrc or similar files to load an arbitrary library into all processes. They can replace binaries in $PATH with malicious code. They can interpose any socket in $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR, like Wayland, and do keylogging or record window contents. They can scan the filesystem for secrets: SSH keys, password stores, etc. They can connect to an unlocked keyring and steal credentials. And so on and so forth.
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Excerpt limited to ~120 words for fair-use compliance. The full article is at Github.
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