Show HN: Minimal Linux sandboxes to manage AI-Generated Code with ease
agentjail is a beta tool that provides minimal Linux sandboxes for securely running untrusted code, such as AI-generated scripts or npm packages, using kernel-level isolation. It leverages namespaces, seccomp filters, cgroups, and Landlock to restrict access to system resources and prevent privilege escalation. The tool is designed without a daemon or setuid helpers, aiming to offer strong security guarantees on Linux 5.13+ systems.
- ▪agentjail uses Linux namespaces, pivot_root, seccomp, cgroups, and Landlock to isolate untrusted code in a minimal environment.
- ▪It blocks dangerous syscalls like ptrace, mount, and chroot, and restricts network access via an in-process HTTP CONNECT proxy with domain allowlisting.
- ▪The tool requires Linux ≥ 5.13, cgroup v2, user namespaces, and currently supports presets for build, install, agent, GPU, and development workloads.
- ▪Resource limits include memory, CPU, PIDs, and disk I/O, with a barrier pipe ensuring cgroups are applied before process startup.
- ▪agentjail is available as a Rust crate and supports real-time monitoring, event streaming, and snapshotting of jailed processes.
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Record
| Original publisher | GitHub |
| Canonical URL | https://github.com/bugthesystem/agentjail |
| Publication time | Tue, 28 Apr 2026 09:27:17 +0000 |
| Retrieval time | 2026-04-28T09:39:15.369Z |
| Last seen | 2026-04-28T09:39:15.369Z |
| Headline source | Publisher (no WeSearch rewrite) |
| Excerpt source | publisher body |
| Excerpt method | First ~120 words (~800 chars) of extracted publisher body, fair-use limited. |
| Summary | WeSearch · cerebras-chat (WeSearch summarizer) |
| Summary source text | contentText |
| Citation coverage | Summary is a WeSearch-generated derivative; primary citation is the original publisher URL. |
| Cluster | 7HUu23w7ezXE |
| Cluster logic | Grouped by semantic title/content similarity across sources within a rolling window. Same-publisher template collisions are excluded from coverage comparison. |
| Ranking reason | Story pages are not engagement-ranked. Hub feeds use recency, with optional source-diversified chronological ordering (cap consecutive stories per source). No personalized ranking. |
| Publisher visit | Yes — open original |
| Substitutes article? | No — link-out required for full text |
Rights status (four layers)
WeSearch handling by dimension
| Indexing | May the item be indexed (stored, ranked, made findable)? | Allowed |
| Snippet | May a short excerpt of the publisher's text be shown? | Allowed |
| AI summary | May WeSearch generate its own short summary of the article? | Limited |
| Retrieval / RAG | May the content be exposed for third-party retrieval-augmented generation? | Not asserted |
| Model training | May the content be used to train AI models? | Not asserted |
| Commercial reuse | May the content be reused commercially? | Not permitted |
Basis: Derived from the published RSS/Atom feed. Contact: [email protected]. Reviewed: 2026-07-24.
Opening excerpt (first ~120 words) tap to expand
agentjail Minimal Linux sandboxes for running untrusted code. Why Model-generated code, npm install on a fresh repo, a PR's test suite, an MCP tool the agent picked — all run as you, on your kernel. They can read ~/.ssh, fork-bomb the host, dial any IP, spawn a reverse shell. Docker isn't a sandbox. nobody isn't a sandbox. agentjail is. One jail is one child process inside fresh Linux namespaces, pivot-rooted into a minimal rootfs, seccomp-filtered, cgroup-limited, egress-allowlisted. No VM. No daemon. No setuid helper. Beta. Core crate (crates/agentjail) is the load-bearing piece, covered by make test-rust-privileged. Control plane, SDKs, web UI, gateway are useful but APIs may move before 1.0. Isolation Namespaces — mount, network, IPC, PID; user optional.
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Excerpt limited to ~120 words for fair-use compliance. The full article is at GitHub.